Ideas from 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?' by Alvin Plantinga [1973], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Possible and the Actual' (ed/tr Loux,Michael J.) [Cornell 1979,0-8014-9178-9]].
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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11984
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Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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11980
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A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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11982
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If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different
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11983
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It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos
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11985
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If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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11986
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The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
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11987
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Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently
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